Abstract-The optimization of facility-based systems (FBSs) is considered. First, the congestion game is converted into a matrix form so that the matrix approach is applicable. Then, an FBS with a system performance criterion is considered. A necessary and sufficient condition is given to assure that the system is convertible into a congestion game with the given system performance criterion as its potential function by designing proper facility-cost functions. Using this technology, for a dynamic FBS, the global optimization may be reached when each agent optimizes its payoff functions. Finally, the approach is extended to those systems that are partly or nearly convertible. Note that the proposed methodology can only be applied to classical congestion games, where the user with multiple unit demands is not allowed.
I. INTRODUCTION
The distributed resource allocation problem, such as distributed welfare [9] , cost sharing [1] , [6] , etc., aims at optimal resource distribution. This problem has been formulated as a congestion game, which is a special class of potential games [10] , [12] . Precisely speaking, by designing proper utility functions to each agent, the overall welfare (or overall cost) is considered as the potential function. Then, the techniques developed for game theoretic control (GTC) are applicable to find pure Nash equilibriums, which provide candidates of optimal solutions [7] , [8] .
In a distributed resource allocation problem, the overall welfare is separable, if it can be written as W = r ∈R W r (1) where {W r } is the set of separated welfare functions. In recent works, this separability is assumed. For instance, as described in [9] , distributed welfare game is a tuple G = {N, R, {A i }, {W r }, {f r }}, where {W r }, the welfare function for resource r, is known and the overall welfare W = r ∈R W r is determined. In this note, we consider a facility-based system (FBS) as G = {N, R, {A i }, P }, where P = W is a global performance criterion, which could be considered as overall welfare/cost, etc. The main problem concerned here is: Can we convert this FBS to a congestion game? That is, can we design the facility-cost functions (FCF) Ξ r , such that the corresponding welfare functions P r = W r for facility r satisfy (1)? Briefly speaking, we want to know whether W is separable? If "yes," the GTC techniques developed in [1] , [6] , and [9] , can be used for FBSs.
In resorting to semitensor product (STP) of matrices, the problem is investigated by expressing a congestion game into its matrix form. Then, the separability problem becomes solving a set of linear equations. The main contribution of this note consists of two parts: 1) Check whether the objective function is separable. If "yes," the design of cost functions is proposed; and 2) If "no," the nearest separable potential game is considered, which enlarges the applicable set of the previous design method to facility-based games. However, our approach is only applicable to single-unit-demand FBSs. In the case of "multiple unit demands," the game is, in general, not potential, so the problem will be very complicated and remains for further investigation.
The STP of matrices is a generalization of conventional matrix product and all the computational properties of the conventional matrix product remain available. Throughout this note, the default matrix product is STP, so the product of two arbitrary matrices is well defined and the symbol is mostly omitted. A brief survey on STP and related notations is provided in the Appendix.
The rest of this note is organized as follows. Section II proposes a matrix-form description for a congestion game. Section III provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the separability. In Section IV, the congestion game approach is extended to cases where facilities are either restricted or inconsistent.
II. MATRIX EXPRESSION OF CONGESTION GAMES

A congestion game is a tuple
where N is the set of players; M is the finite set of facilities to be shared by players; the facility-cost function Ξ j : R → R describes the cost of facility j ∈ M , which depends on the number of players using the facility j in a profile a; A i ⊂ 2 M is the strategy (action) set of player i and each strategy (action) in A i is a subset of M , which means that player i has the option of selecting multiple facilities [10] .
Denote the set of profiles as A = n i = 1 A i . For a profile a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ A, the number of users of facility j is denoted as
Define the payoff function of player i, i.e., c i : and a function P : A → R as
Using (3) and (4), we have the following result. Theorem 2.1 (see [10] ): A congestion game is a potential game with payoff functions in (3) and the potential function in (4) .
In the following, we will express (3) and (4) into matrix forms. Assume
To begin with, we consider the FCFs Ξ j . Denote
. . , n; j = 1, . . . , m where k is the number of players using facility j ∈ M. Then, Ξ j can be expressed in a vector form as
Putting all the FCFs together, we have
Next, we express each strategy (action) a i ∈ A i into a vector form. Since a i ∈ 2 M , we use an index vector to express it. Let a i ∈ R m be a column vector with entries as
Using (2), we construct
It can be verified that
Define
Using them, we construct
A straightforward computation shows the following result.
Proposition 2.2:
The payoff functions c i can be expressed as
Finally, we construct a set of Boolean vectors as
and define
Then, we can prove the following result.
Proposition 2.3:
The potential function can be expressed as
III. OPTIMIZATION VIA DESIGNED FACILITY COSTS
A. Design of FCFs
First, we give a rigorous description for an FBS:
. . , n} is the set of players and M = {1, 2, . . . , m} is the set of facilities shared by players. Each player is capable of selecting potentially multiple facilities in M ; therefore, we say that player i has strategy (or action) set A i ⊂ 2 M , that is, the set of certain subsets of M . P : A → R is the system's overall cost, which needs to be minimized.
i is called the set of profiles of the system. Our purpose is to find a profile a * ∈ A, such that
The fundamental idea of the technique developed in this paper is: Choosing suitable FCFs such that the FBS can be converted into a congestion game with a preassigned performance criterion P (a) as its potential function. Then, we use properties of the potential game to realize the optimization. Therefore, the key issue is: Can we find a suitable set of FCFs such that the given P (a) becomes its potential function? To answer this question, we construct a linear system as follows.
Assume |A| = (that is, there are different profiles) and denote
. , S }. A linear system is defined as
where
. . .
B(S )
and B(a) is defined in (10) . The following result answers the above question.
Theorem 3.2:
Consider an FBS. A set of FCFs can be found such that the FBS becomes a congestion game with P (a) as its potential function, if and only if (13) has at least one solution.
Proof: The necessity comes from the matrix expression of a congestion game. Precisely speaking, collecting (11) for all a ∈ A together yields (13). As for the sufficiency, using the solution of (13), i.e., Ξ, it is easy to construct the corresponding FCFs. Then, a straightforward computation shows that the corresponding potential function is exactly the given P (a).
Remark 3.3: Using (13), we have
is the separated cost for facility i, i = 1, . . . , m. One can easily see that
. Hence, (13) implies a standard distributed cost structure [7] . *
B. Dynamics of FBSs
Definition 3.4: An FBS is called a dynamic FBS if the system (or game) is repeated and the strategy profile is updated in Markov style as
The dynamic equation (14) is determined by the strategy updating rules (SURs). There are several commonly used SURs. We refer to [5] and [11] for more SURs and the constructing process of building the dynamic model using SURs. Only one SUR, called the myopic best response arrangement (MBRA), is used in this paper. We briefly describe it as follows: Consider a game with N = {1, 2, . . . , s} and player i has its strategies as
Assume at time t, the other players use their strategies as a −i ∈ j = i A j , and the player i is allowed to update his strategy at the next moment t + 1, then he will choose
MBRA is widely used because it has the following property. Theorem 3.5 (see [10] ): Consider a finite potential game. 1) It has at least one pure Nash equilibrium.
2) If at each moment only one player is allowed to update his strategy and MBRA is used, then the dynamic potential game will converge to its Nash equilibrium. Remark 3.6: 1) Assume (13) has solution. The profile a * , such that (12) holds, is a Nash equilibrium.
2) It is worth noting that, in general, a congestion game may have more than one Nash equilibriums. As long as the Nash equilibrium is unique, MBRA-based dynamics will converge to this unique Nash equilibrium, which is also the minimum point of P (a).
IV. DESIGN FOR RESTRICTED FBSS
A. Partly Designable Facilities
This section considers the case when only part of FCFs can be designed. This situation happens, for instance, when the rest of the facilities are owned by other companies or so, and hence, you can only design the FCFs of your own facilities.
Based on the attribution of design right, the finite set of facilities M can be divided into two disjoint sets as follows:
such that for each facility j, its FCF can be designed, if and only if j ∈ Ω . * This is pointed out by an anonymous reviewer. Now, set Ω = {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i t } ⊆ M. According to this partition in M , similarly, we divide Ξ, B(a) and P (a), respectively, as = [b 1 (a), . . . , b i 1 −1 (a), b i 1 + 1 (a) , . . . ,
From the aforementioned definitions, one can easily see thatΞ,B(a), andP (a) are only related to the facilities in Ω . Using above denotations, a linear system is defined as
B(S )
The following result is an immediate consequence of Theorem 3.2.
Corollary 4.1:
Consider an FBS with a given performance criterion P (a). If only part of FCFs can be designed, a set of FCFs can be found such that the FBS becomes a congestion game with P (a) as its potential function, if and only if (16) has at least one solution.
B. Restricted Facilities
This section considers the case when some facilities are restricted because of, for instance, their ultimate bearing capacity. Hence, you can only consider desirable profiles.
Assume a set of constraints are given as
We say, for a profile a, it is a desirable one, if and only if it satisfies (17). Otherwise, it is undesirable.
Hence, according to (17), we can verify that the set of profiles A contains two disjoint parts expressed as
where Ω is the set of desirable profiles, while Ω c is the set of undesirable ones.
In order to assure the Nash equilibrium a * ∈ Ω, we further define payoff functions c i (a) and performance criterion P (a), respectively, as follows:c
where c *
where P * max{P (a)|a ∈ Ω}. From the definition of Ω and (19), the following result can be obtained.
Proposition 4.2:
The minimization of performance criterion P (a) is equivalent to that ofP (a). That is
A linear system is defined as
B(S l 2 )
B(S l k
According to Proposition 4.2 and Theorem 3.2, we have the following result.
Corollary 4.3:
Consider an FBS with a given performance criterion P (a). If facilities are restricted as (17), a set of FCFs can be found such that the FBS becomes a congestion game with P (a) as its potential function, if and only if (20) has at least one solution.
C. FBS With Improper P
Consider an FBS G with given Ξ and P . Assume for this given P , (13) has no solution. For this case, the dynamical equivalence is applied to investigate its convergence to Nash equilibriums. Definition 4.4 (see [4] ): Two evolutionary games are said to be dynamically equivalent, if they have the same strategy profile dynamics [that is, f i ,˜i = 1, 2, . . . , n, defined in (14)].
First, we give the process of constructing an FBS G s closest congestion game G 0 .
Let B 0 be the matrix consisting of maximum linear independent columns of B defined in (13). Hence, B 0 has full column rank.
From (13), one easily sees that the subspace of the congestion games, denoted by V p , is spanned by the columns of B 0 . That is
For an FBS G with given P (a), it is clear that the least square solution for (13) is
Using this Ξ 0 , the corresponding potential function P 0 can be calculated via (13). Then, we have the following definition. Definition 4.5: For an FBS G with given P , the game G 0 is said to be its closest congestion game, if the FCFs and the potential functions are Ξ 0 and P 0 as aforementioned.
According to Definition 4.4, the following proposition is straightforwardly verifiable.
Proposition 4.6:
If an FBS G with given P and Ξ is dynamically equivalent to its closest congestion game G 0 , then it can be led to a pure Nash equilibrium.
Assume there exists ≥ 0, such that
The following result can be obtained. Proposition 4.7: Assume (23) and MBRA are used to generate the dynamics of G by using Ξ and Ξ 0 , respectively. If these two dynamics are dynamically equivalent, then G with Ξ will converge to a Nash equilibrium. If the Nash equilibrium, denoted by a * , is unique, it is a near smallest point, that is
Example 4.8: Given an FBS with N = {1, 2, 3}, M = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} Similarly, B(S i ), i = 2, 3, . . . , 18, can also be calculated. Then, the coefficient matrix B for (13) is obtained as 1) Assume the system performance criterion P (a) is given in Table I .
It is easy to verify that (13) 
According to Theorem 3.2, under the FCFs determined by (24), the system becomes a congestion game with preassigned P (a) as its potential function. 2) Assume the system performance criterion P (a) and the FCFs Ξ are given as It is easy to verify that for the given P, (13) has no solution. Hence, we consider its closest congestion game. First, we can easily obtain B 0 from B by deleting the last three columns of B as 
Using (22) Next, we can calculate the payoff functions of G by using Ξ and Ξ 0 , respectively, which are shown in Tables II and III (roundoff to  0.01) . Using the MBRA, we can get the best responding strategies. It is obvious that they have the same strategy updating dynamics f 1 , f 2 , and f 3 , which are shown in Table IV . According to Definition 4.4, we know that these two dynamics are dynamically equivalent. Hence, the FBS with given Ξ and P has at least one Nash equilibrium. Moreover, for the FBS G with Ξ, we have a switched system as
where σ ∈ {1, 2, 3} [10, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 17, 9, 10, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 17, 9] L 2 = δ 18 [7, 5, 6, 7, 5, 6, 7, 5, 6, Now, we assume the probability P (σ = i) = 1/3, i = 1, 2, 3, and three initial profiles are randomly chosen for a MATLAB simulation. The results are shown in Fig. 1 . From Fig. 1 , one sees that the strategy profile dynamics, starting from any initial profile, will converge to the unique Nash equilibrium δ 5 18 ∼ {1, 2, 2}. Finally, we assume = 0.9. It is easy to calculate that
According to Proposition 4.7, we know that the Nash equilibrium δ 5 18 ∼ {1, 2, 2} is a near smallest point, that is
In fact, it can be verified that for this example, we have |P (a * ) − P m in | = 0.
V. CONCLUSION
This note investigates the cooperative control of an FBS via congestion game approach. First, a matrix-form description of a congestion game is presented. Then, a necessary and sufficient condition is obtained to assure the separability of the preassigned performance criterion P (a). That is, the FBS can be converted into a congestion game with P (a) as its potential function. Using properties of potential games, the convergence to a Nash equilibrium is obtained. Third, the result has been extended to some incomplete cases where P (a) is not separable. Particularly, the problem of near dynamic congestion game is considered. It is proved that under dynamic equivalence, the near congestion games may also be led to a Nash equilibrium.
Our approach can only be used for classical congestion games, where the user with multiple unit demands is not allowed. For instance, in the transportation congestion model, a route segment cannot be used by a player for more than once. But the user with multiple unit demands is an interesting and challenging problem. It could be studied in the future.
This appendix gives a brief survey for STP of matrices. We refer to [2] and [3] for more details.
For technical statement ease, we first introduce some notations. 1) M m ×n : the set of m × n real matrices. 
where M i is the structure matrix of f i , i = 1, . . . , n, and x(t) = n i = 1 x i (t). Multiplying both sides of (30) together, we can have a more compact form for (29).
Theorem 5.3 (see [3] ): Consider system (29). Using (30), it can be expressed into its algebraic state-space form as
where L = M 1 * M 2 * · · · * M n , and * is the Khatri-Rao product.
